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The Determinants of Corporate 
Venture Capital Success 
Organizational Structure, 
Incentives, and Complementarities 
Paul A. Gompers and Josh Lerner 
The structure of private equity organizations-in  particular, the reliance 
on limited partnerships of finite life with substantial profit sharing-has 
been identified as critical to their success. Jensen (1993) and Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997b), among others, have attributed the rapid growth of private 
equity organizations to the ways in which their design addresses moral haz- 
ard and information-asymmetry problems. These claims, however, have 
received little empirical scrutiny. 
This paper addresses this omission by comparing investments made by 
traditional venture capital organizations with those of venture funds spon- 
sored by corporations. These corporate funds have similar missions and 
are staffed by individuals with backgrounds resembling those in indepen- 
dent organizations. But the organizational and incentive structures in cor- 
porate funds are very different: most are structured as corporate subsidi- 
aries and have much lower incentive-based compensation. In this respect, 
corporate funds differ dramatically from both independent venture organ- 
izations  and funds associated  with  commercial  and investment  banks. 
(Many bank-affiliated funds retain the autonomous partnership structure 
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employed by independent venture organizations, albeit with a lower share 
of the profits accruing to the venture investors.) 
Thus, the contrast between corporate and independent venture funds 
provides a natural  test  case  for examining the effect of  organizational 
structure on investment performance. The arguments regarding the im- 
portance of the structure of independent private equity organizations sug- 
gest that corporate programs would prove less successful. Either their pro- 
cess of selecting or overseeing investments would be distorted, or else the 
programs would prove unstable. It may be, however, that corporate pro- 
grams enjoy benefits that offset some of these costs. A lengthy literature 
on complementarities in the strategy literature argues that corporations 
can benefit from closely related activities (for a review and formalization, 
see Athey  and Stern [1997]). Corporations may  be  able to select better 
ventures using the information from their related lines of business or may 
add greater value to the firms once the investments are made. 
Before turning to the empirical analysis, we consider the experience of 
Xerox Technology Ventures, which illustrates both these points. This cor- 
porate venture fund compiled excellent financial returns between 1988 and 
1996 by aggressively exploiting the technology and knowledge of the cor- 
porate parent. Nonetheless, the corporate parent dissolved the fund before 
the ending date originally intended. The case highlights the fact that- 
contrary to both popular wisdom and academic arguments-corporate 
venture programs can still be successful without the traditional partner- 
ship structure. The case also suggests, however, some of the difficulties that 
these efforts encounter and the apparent importance of having a strong 
linkage between the fund’s investment focus and the corporate parent’s 
strategic focus. 
We  then consider the more general evidence. Using the Ventureone 
database of private equity financings, we  examine over thirty thousand 
investments in entrepreneurial firms by venture capital programs. The mix 
of firms in which corporate venture funds invested is little different than 
that of traditional organizations. 
The first set of tests relates to the performance of firms financed by 
corporate venture capitalists as opposed to those funded by independent 
funds. If the structural features of the independent funds are critical, we 
should expect that their investments would perform better. The corporate 
funds, hampered by poor incentives and management interference, would 
be unable to select or oversee firms effectively. If corporations can exploit 
complementarities with their existing lines of business while evaluating or 
assisting portfolio firms, however, their investments may actually perform 
better. This should be particularly true for corporate investments in very 
similar businesses. It is unclear whether corporations will pay more or less 
than other investors in these cases: it may be that the corporate investor The Determinants of Corporate Venture Capital Success  19 
will be willing to pay more than other investors owing to the indirect bene- 
fits that it alone enjoys. 
When we  examine the empirical evidence, we  find that, far from being 
outright failures, corporate venture investments in entrepreneurial firms ap- 
pear to be at least as successful (using such measures as the probability of 
the portfolio firm going public) as those backed by independent venture or- 
ganizations. This appears to be particularly true for investments in which 
there is strategic overlap between the corporate parent and the portfolio 
firm. It is harder to assess the relative returns that independent and corpo- 
rate venture organizations enjoy. Corporations are likely to benefit from 
indirect gains (e.g., strategic alliances and greater understanding of indus- 
try trends) as well  as direct financial returns.'  While corporate venture 
capitalists tend to invest at a premium to other firms, this premium ap- 
pears to be no higher in investments with a strong strategic fit where these 
benefits are likely to be greatest. 
We then consider the duration of the programs themselves. We consider 
two potential reasons why corporate programs might be short-lived, First, 
it may be that corporations need to employ such programs only during 
periods of severe technological discontinuity. After such periods of rapid 
change pass, the programs are no longer needed. If programs were gener- 
ally designed to address short-run technological discontinuities, it should 
be the strategic programs that have the shortest duration. A second possi- 
bility is that large corporations find it difficult to duplicate the autonomy 
and the high-powered compensation schemes offered in independent ven- 
ture funds. As a result, key  personnel may depart once they establish a 
track record and relationships with outside investors. 
The empirical evidence suggests that corporate programs are much less 
stable than those of independent funds. The programs frequently cease 
operations after only a few investments. We  show that the instability is 
particularly great in  corporate funds whose investments do not have a 
strong strategic focus. This result is hard to reconcile with the first hy- 
pothesis. 
In short, the evidence seems to underscore the importance of the com- 
plementarities  hypothesis outlined above. Portfolio companies receiving 
funds from corporate investors with a well-defined strategic focus enjoy 
greater success. Investments are made at a premium, but this may reflect 
the indirect  benefits that the corporation receives. Corporate programs 
with a well-defined strategic focus also appear to be as stable as traditional 
independent venture organizations. Among the corporate funds without a 
1. Of course, these programs may also be associated with costs to the firms as well, such 
as distraction  from the primary mission of  the organization.  These are difficult for us to 
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strong strategic focus, we see significantly less success in investments and 
less stability than among the focused funds. 
We  end with a more general discussion of the implications. It may be 
that-contrary  to the emphasis in  the finance literature-the  structure 
of corporate venture funds is not a critical barrier. Rather, the presence of 
a strong strategic focus may be critical. Alternatively, the corporate pro- 
grams without  a strong strategic focus may also have particularly weak 
incentive schemes and other problematic structural characteristics. 
This paper is related to an extensive corporate finance literature about 
the relation between organizational structure and corporate performance 
(reviewed, e.g., in Jensen [1993]). More specifically, a set of papers has 
examined  the structure of financial  institutions  and investment  perfor- 
mance. Among these are studies of the performance of initial public offer- 
ings underwritten by investment banks that are and are not affiliated with 
commercial banks (Kroszner and Rajan  1994), the performance of loans 
underwritten by  savings-and-loan institutions structured as mutual and 
stock organizations (Cordell, MacDonald, and Wohar 1993), and the ef- 
fect of mutual fund performance on investment choices and returns (Che- 
valier and Ellison 1997). As far as we are aware, however, no paper has 
analyzed the effect of the limited-partnership structure on investment per- 
formance. 
This paper is also related to a body of literature on private equity part- 
nerships more generally. These writings suggest reasons to be both positive 
and skeptical about the importance of the partnership structure. On the 
one hand, a set of articles documents that investments by private equity 
organizations are associated with real changes in the firms that they fund, 
measured on both an accounting (Muscarella and Vetsuypens 1990) and 
a financial (Brav and Gompers 1997) basis. Moreover, the structure of 
private equity groups-whether  measured through the sensitivity of com- 
pensation to performance (Gompers and Lerner 1999) or the extent of 
contractual restrictions (Gompers and Lerner 1996)-appears  to be re- 
sponsive to the changing investment mix and characteristics of the funds. 
On the other hand, it appears that other factors (e.g., relative supply and 
demand conditions for private equity funds [Gompers and Lerner 19961) 
can also affect the structure of partnerships. Furthermore, certain features 
of partnerships  apparently  can lead  to pathological  outcomes.  For in- 
stance, policies allowing venture capitalists to distribute shares in stock, 
designed to maximize investors’ choices regarding the liquidation of their 
positions, have been exploited by  some private equity groups to inflate 
returns and to boost their compensation (Gompers and Lerner 1998).  This 
paper raises questions about the necessity of the partnership structure em- 
ployed by independent private equity funds. 
The organization of this paper is as follows. In section 1.1, we briefly 
summarize the history of corporate venture capital funds. Section 1.2 dis- The Determinants of Corporate Venture Capital Success  21 
cusses the case of Xerox Technology Ventures. Section 1.3 describes the 
data set. The empirical analysis is presented in section 1.4. Section 1.5 con- 
cludes. 
1.1  The History of Corporate Venture Capital Investment 
The first corporate venture funds began in the mid-l960s, about two 
decades after the first formal venture capital funds.2 The corporate efforts 
were spurred by the successes of the first organized venture capital funds, 
which backed such firms as Digital Equipment, Memorex, Raychem, and 
Scientific Data Systems. Excited by  this success, large companies began 
establishing divisions that emulated venture  capitalists. During the late 
1960s and early 1970s, more than 25 percent of the Fortune 500 firms at- 
tempted corporate venture programs. 
These efforts generally took two forms, external and internal. At one 
end  of  the  spectrum,  large corporations  financed  new  firms alongside 
other venture capitalists. In many cases, the corporations simply provided 
funds for a venture capitalist to invest. Other firms invested directly in 
start-ups, giving them a greater ability to tailor their portfolios to their 
particular needs. At the other extreme, large corporations attempted to 
tap the entrepreneurial spirit within their organizations. These programs 
sought to allow entrepreneurs to focus their attention on developing their 
innovations while relying on the corporation for financial, legal, and mar- 
keting support. 
In  1973, the  market  for  new  public  offerings-the  primary  avenue 
through which venture capitalists exit successful investments-abruptly 
declined. Independent  venture  partnerships  began experiencing signifi- 
cantly less attractive returns and encountered severe difficulties in raising 
new funds. At the same time, corporations began scaling back their own 
initiatives. The typical corporate venture program begun in the late 1960s 
was dissolved after only four years. 
Funds flowing into the venture capital industry and the number of ac- 
tive venture  organizations  increased dramatically  during the late  1970s 
and early 1980s. An important factor accounting for the increase in money 
flowing into the venture capital sector was the  1979 amendment to the 
“prudent man” rule governing pension fund investments; also important 
2. This history is based in part on Fast (1978), Gee (1994), and Venture Economics (1986), 
among other sources. 
The origin of the formal venture capital industry in the United States dates back to the 
formation of American Research and Development in 1946. (Venture capital can be defined 
as equity or equity-linked investments in young, privately held companies, where the investor 
is a financial intermediary who is typically active as a director, an adviser, or even a manager 
of the firm.) A handful of other venture funds were established in the years after the pioneer- 
ing fund’s formation, but the annual flow of money into new venture funds was quite modest 
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was  the lowering of capital gains tax rates in  1978. Prior to  1979, the 
Employee Retirement  Income Security Act limited pension  funds from 
investing substantial amounts of money in venture capital or other high- 
risk asset classes. The Department of Labor’s clarification of the rule ex- 
plicitly allowed pension managers to invest in high-risk assets, including 
venture capital. Fueled by these eased restrictions and a robust market for 
public offerings, fund-raising by independent venture partnerships recov- 
ered in the early 1980s. Corporations were also once again attracted to the 
promise of venture investing in  response. These efforts peaked  in  1986, 
when corporate funds managed $2 billion, or nearly 12 percent of the total 
pool of venture capital. 
After the stock market crash of 1987, however, the market for new pub- 
lic  offerings again went  into  a  sharp decline. Returns  from  and fund- 
raising by independent partnerships declined sharply. Corporations scaled 
back their commitment to venture investing even more dramatically. By 
1992, the number of corporate venture programs had fallen by one-third, 
and their capital under management represented  only 5 percent of the 
venture pool. 
Interest in corporate venture capital climbed once again in the mid- 
1990s, both in the United States and abroad. Once again, much of this 
interest was stimulated by the recent success of the independent venture 
sector: that is, the rapid growth of funds and their attractive returns. These 
corporate funds have invested directly in a variety of internal and external 
ventures as well as in funds organized by independent venture capitalists. 
(Venture Economics estimates that corporate investors accounted for 30 
percent of the commitments to new funds in 1997, up from an average of 
5 percent in the period  1990-92  [estimates compiled from various issues 
of the Venture Capital Journal].) 
This brief discussion makes clear that corporate involvement in venture 
capital has mirrored (perhaps even in an exaggerated manner) the cyclic 
nature of the entire venture capital industry over the past three decades. 
At the same time, numerous discussions suggest that certain basic non- 
cyclic issues also have a significant effect on corporate venture capital ac- 
tivity. 
In particular, it appears that the frequent disillusion of earlier corporate 
venture programs was  due to three  structural failings. First, these pro- 
grams suffered because their missions were not well  defined (Fast 1978; 
Siegel, Siegel, and MacMillan 1988). Typically, they sought to accomplish 
a wide array of not necessarily compatible objectives: from providing a 
window on emerging technologies to generating attractive financial re- 
turns. The confusion over program objectives often led to dissatisfaction 
with outcomes. For instance, when outside venture capitalists were hired 
to run a corporate fund under  a contract that linked compensation to 
financial performance, management frequently became frustrated about 
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A second cause of failure was insufficient corporate commitment to the 
venturing  initiative (Hardymon, DiNino,  and Salter  1983; Rind  1981; 
Sykes 1990). Even if top management embraced the concept, middle man- 
agement often resisted. Research-and-development (R&D) personnel pre- 
ferred that funds be devoted to internal programs; corporate lawyers dis- 
liked the novelty and complexity of these hybrid organizations. In many 
cases, new  senior management teams terminated programs, seeing them 
as expendable “pet projects” of their predecessors. Even if they did not ob- 
ject to the idea of the program, managers were often concerned about its 
effect on the firm’s accounting earnings. During periods of financial pres- 
sure, money-losing subsidiaries were frequently terminated in an effort to 
increase reported operating earnings. 
A final cause of failure was inadequate compensation schemes (Block 
and Ornati 1987; Lawler and Drexel 1980). Corporations have frequently 
been  reluctant  to compensate  their  venture  managers  through  profit- 
sharing (“carried-interest”) provisions, fearing that  they might need to 
make huge payments if their investments were successful. Typically, suc- 
cessful risk taking was inadequately rewarded and failure excessively pun- 
ished.  As  a  result,  corporations were  frequently  unable  to attract  top 
people (i.e., those who combined industry experience with connections to 
other venture capitalists) to run their venture funds. All too often, corpo- 
rate venture managers adopted a conservative approach to investing. No- 
where was this behavior more clearly manifested than in the treatment of 
lagging ventures. Independent venture capitalists often cut off funding to 
failing firms because they want to devote their limited energy to firms with 
the greatest promise. Corporate venture capitalists have frequently been 
unwilling to write off  unsuccessful ventures, lest they incur the reputa- 
tional repercussions that a failure would entail. 
1.2  The Case of Xerox Technology Ventures (XTV) 
These general observations can be illustrated through a case study. The 
Xerox Corporation originated as a photography-paper business called the 
Haloid C~mpany.~  The Haloid Company’s entrance into what would later 
become its principal business came in 1947, when it and the Battelle Me- 
morial Institute, a research  organization, agreed to produce  a machine 
based on the recently developed process named xerography. Invented by 
the patent lawyer Chester Carlson, xerography involved a process by which 
images were transferred from one piece of paper to another by means of 
static electricity. Rapid growth and a redirection of the company’s empha- 
sis toward xerography characterized the Haloid Company in the 1950s. In 
1961, in recognition of the spectacular growth of sales engendered by the 
first plain-paper copier, the firm was renamed the Xerox Corporation. 
3. The first sixteen paragraphs of this section are based on Hunt and Lerner (1995). 24  Paul A. Gompers and Josh Lerner 
In response to IBM’s entrance into the copier field in  the late 1960s, 
Xerox  experimented  with  computers and with  designing an electronic 
office of the future. It formed Xerox Computer Services, acquired Scien- 
tific Data Systems, and opened its Palo Alto Research Center (PARC) in 
California. These efforts were only the beginning of the copier giant’s effort 
to become a force in the computer industry. Throughout the 1970s, Xerox 
completed several acquisitions in order to further its project for an “archi- 
tecture of information.” Unfortunately, in assembling these noncopier com- 
panies and opening PARC, Xerox created a clash of cultures. Differences 
between its East Coast operations and its West Coast computer people 
would severely affect the company. 
The focus for much of this division was PARC. In the  1970s, PARC 
was remarkably successful in developing ingenious products that would 
fundamentally alter the nature of computing. The Ethernet, the graphic 
user interface (the basis of Apple Computer’s and Microsoft’s Windows 
software), the “mouse,” and the laser printer were all originally developed 
at PARC. The culmination of much of PARC’s innovation was its develop- 
ment of the Alto, a very early personal computer. The Alto’s first proto- 
type was completed in  1973, and later versions were placed in the White 
House, Congress, and various companies and universities. Nonetheless, 
the Alto project was terminated in 1980. 
Inherent in the Alto’s demise was Xerox’s relationship with PARC. Xe- 
rox did not have a clear-cut business strategy for its research laboratory, 
and, in turn, many of PARC’s technologies did not fit into Xerox’s strategic 
objectives. For instance, the Alto’s ability to adapt to large customers’ com- 
puter systems was inconsistent with Xerox’s strategy of producing work- 
stations compatible only with its own equipment. 
The establishment of XTV was driven by two events in 1988. First, sev- 
eral senior Xerox managers were involved in negotiating and approving a 
spin-off from Xerox, ParcPlace, which sought to commercialize an object- 
oriented programming  language developed at PARC in the  1970s. The 
negotiation of these agreements proved to be protracted and painful, high- 
lighting the difficulty that the company faced in dealing with these contin- 
gencies. More important, in this year a book documenting Xerox’s failure 
to develop the personal computer, Fumbling the Future (Smith and Alex- 
ander 1988), appeared. Stung by the description in the book, Xerox chair- 
man David Kearns established a task force with the mandate of preventing 
the repetition of such a failure to capitalize on Xerox innovations. 
The task force reviewed Xerox’s history  with corporate venture pro- 
grams. Xerox had invested in venture-backed firms since the early 1970s. 
For instance, it had joined a variety of venture capitalists in investing in 
Rolm, Apple, and a number of other firms. While the investments were 
successful financially, they were made on an ad hoc basis. In the early 
1980s, Xerox established two venture funds with an external focus. These 
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firm about appropriate investments. The task force, in member (and future 
XTV  president)  Robert  Adams’s  words,  rapidly  “concluded  that  we 
needed a system to prevent technology from leaking out of the company” 
(Armstrong 1993). The committee focused on two options: (1) to begin 
aggressively litigating those who try to leave with new technologies and 
(2) to invest in people trying to leave Xerox. Owing to variations in em- 
ployee noncompetition law across states (and particularly the weak level 
of protection afforded by the California courts), it was unclear how effec- 
tive a policy of aggressive litigation would be. Furthermore, such a policy 
might reduce Xerox’s ability to recruit the best research personnel, who 
might not want to limit their future mobility. 
On the basis of the task force’s recommendation, Kearns decided to 
pursue a corporate venture capital program. He agreed to commit  $30 
million to invest in promising technologies developed at Xerox. As he 
commented at the time, “XTV is a hedge against repeating missteps of the 
past” (Armstrong 1993). He briefly considered the possibility of asking an 
established venture capital firm to run the program jointly with Xerox but 
decided that the involvement of another party would introduce a formality 
that might hurt the fledgling venture. 
Modeling XTV after venture organizations had several dimensions. The 
most obvious was the structure of the organization. While this was a cor- 
porate division rather than an independent partnership (like most venture 
organizations), the XTV partners crafted an agreement with Xerox that 
resembled typical agreements between limited and general partners in ven- 
ture funds. 
The spinout process was clearly defined in the agreement in order to 
ensure that disputes did not arise later on and to minimize the disruption 
to the organization. The XTV officials insisted on a formal procedure to 
avoid  the  ambiguity  that  had  plagued  earlier  corporate ventures.  The 
agreement made clear that the XTV partners had the flexibility to respond 
rapidly to investment opportunities, something that independent venture 
capitalists typically possess. They essentially had full autonomy when it 
came to monitoring, exiting, or liquidating companies. The partners were 
allowed to spend up to $2 million at any one time without getting permis- 
sion from the corporation. For larger expenditures, they were required to 
obtain permission from XTV’s governing board, which consisted of Xe- 
rox’s chief executive officer, chief financial officer, and chief patent counsel. 
Similar to independent venture organizations (but unlike many corpo- 
rate programs), the program also had a clear goal: to maximize return on 
investment. The XTV partners felt that the ambiguous goals of many of 
the 1970s corporate venture programs had been instrumental in their down- 
fall. They hoped  to achieve a return on investment that exceeded both 
the average returns of the venture capital industry and Xerox’s corporate 
hurdle rate for evaluating new projects. 
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percent carried-interest that independent venture capitalists received and 
the degree of autonomy similar, but XTV operated under the same ten- 
year time frame employed in the typical partnership agreement. Under 
certain conditions, however, Xerox could dissolve the partnership after 
five years. 
The analogy to independent venture organizations also extended to the 
companies in which XTV invested. These were structured as separate legal 
entities, with their own boards and officers. XTV sought to recruit employ- 
ees from other start-ups who were familiar with managing new enterprises. 
The typical CEO was hired from the outside on the grounds that entrepre- 
neurial skills, particularly in financial management, were unlikely to be 
found in a major corporation. XTV also made heavy use of temporary 
executives who were familiar with a variety of organizations. 
The independence of management also extended to technological deci- 
sion making in these companies. The traditional Xerox product-for  in- 
stance, a copier-was  designed so that it could be operated and serviced 
in almost any country in the world. This meant not only constraints on 
how the product was engineered but also the preparation of copious docu- 
mentation in many languages. These XTV ventures, however, could pro- 
duce products  for “leading-edge’’ users, who emphasized technological 
performance over careful documentation. 
Like independent venture capitalists, XTV intended to give up control 
of the companies in which they invested. Transferring shares to manage- 
ment and involving other venture capitalists in XTV companies would 
reduce Xerox’s ownership of the firm. Their goal was that, over the long 
run, after several rounds of financing, Xerox would hold from 20 to 50 
percent equity stake. XTV sought to have under a 50 percent equity stake 
at the time a spinout firm went public. In this way,  it would not need to 
consolidate the firm in its balance sheet (i.e., it would not need to include 
the company’s equity on its balance sheet, which would reduce Xerox’s 
return on equity). The Xerox lawyers had originally wanted only employ- 
ees to receive “phantom stock” (typically, bonuses based on the growth 
in the new units’ performance). Instead, XTV insisted that the employ- 
ees receive options to buy real shares in the venture-backed companies, in 
line with traditional Silicon Valley practices. The partners believed that 
this approach would have a much greater psychological effect as well  as 
a cleaner capital structure to attract follow-on financings by outside in- 
vestors. 
Between  1988 and 1996, the organization invested in over one dozen 
companies. These covered a gamut of technologies, mostly involving elec- 
tronic publishing, document processing, electronic imaging, workstation 
and computer peripherals,  software,  and  office automation.  These not 
only successfully commercialized technology lying fallow in the organiza- 
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One successful example of XTV’s ability to catalyze the commerciali- 
zation  of technological discoveries was Documentum,  which marketed 
an object-oriented document-management system. Xerox had undertaken 
a large number of projects in this area for over a decade prior to Docu- 
mentum’s founding, but had not shipped a product. After deciding that 
this was a promising area, XTV recruited Howard Shao and John New- 
ton, both former engineering executives at the Ingress Corporation (a rela- 
tional database manufacturer), to lead the technical effort. 
Shao spent the first six months assessing the state of Xerox’s knowledge 
in  this  area-including  reviewing the  several  three-hundred-plus-page 
business plans prepared  for earlier proposed (but never shipped) prod- 
ucts-and  assessing the market. He soon realized that, while Xerox under- 
stood the nature of the technical problems, the company had not grasped 
how to design a technologically appropriate solution. In particular, the 
Xerox business plans had proposed building document-management sys- 
tems for mainframe computers rather than for networked personal com- 
puters (which were rapidly replacing mainframes at many organizations). 
With the help of the XTV officials, Shao and Newton led an effort rapidly 
to convert Xerox’s accumulated knowledge in this area into a marketable 
product. Xerox’s accumulated knowledge-as  well as XTV’s  aggressive 
funding of the firm during the Gulf War period, when the willingness of 
both independent venture capitalists and the public markets to fund new 
technology-based firms abruptly declined-gave  Documentum an impres- 
sive lead over its rivals. 
Documentum went  public  in  February  1996 with  a  market  capitali- 
zation of $351 milli~n.~  XTV was able to exit a number of other compa- 
nies successfully, whether through an initial public offering, a merger with 
an outside firm, or a repurchase by Xerox (at a price determined through 
arm’s-length bargaining). A conservative calculation (assuming that Xerox 
sold its stakes in firms that went public at the time of the initial public 
offering rather than later, after prices had substantially appreciated, and 
valuing investments that Xerox has not yet exited or written off at cost, 
less a 25  percent discount for illiquidity) indicates that the  $30 million 
fund generated capital gains of $219 million. Given the 80/20 percent split 
established in  the XTV agreement, the proceeds to Xerox should have 
been at least $175 million, those to the three XTV partners at least $44 
million. 
The same assumptions suggest a net internal rate of return for Xerox 
(i.e., after fees and incentive compensation) of at least 56 percent. This 
compares favorably with independent venture capital funds begun in 1989, 
which had a mean net return of 13.7 percent (an upper-quartile fund be- 
gun in that year had a return of 20.4 percent) (Venture Economics 1997). 
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These calculations of Xerox’s internal rate of return (IRR) do not include 
any ancillary benefits generated by this program for the corporation. For 
instance,  some observers argued that  high-expected-value projects  that 
might  otherwise  not  have  been  funded  through  traditional  channels 
(owing to the high risk involved) were increasingly funded during this pe- 
riod, apparently out of the fear that they would otherwise be funded by 
XTV and prove successful. 
Despite these attractive returns, Xerox decided to terminate XTV in 
1996, well before the completion of its originally intended ten-year life.5 
The organization  was replaced with a new  one, Xerox New Enterprises 
(XNE), which did not seek to relinquish control of firms or to involve 
outside venture investors. The XNE business model called for a much 
greater integration of the new units with traditional business units. The 
autonomy offered to the XNE managers and their compensation schemes 
were much closer to that afforded in a traditional corporate division. As 
such, XNE appears to represent a departure from several of the key ele- 
ments that the XTV staff believed were critical to that company’s success, 
such as a considerable degree of autonomy and high-powered incentives. 
The experience of Xerox Technology Ventures has several implications 
for corporate venture  capital programs  more  generally. First,  the case 
makes clear that, contrary to the suggestions in writings by both venture 
capitalists and financial economists, corporate venture capital programs 
need not fail. As noted above, Xerox’s financial returns were exceedingly 
favorable when compared to returns from comparable independent ven- 
ture funds. Second, XTV’s  successes-such  as Document Sciences and 
Documentum-were  concentrated in industries closely related to the cor- 
porate parent’s core line of business (document processing). This suggests 
that the fund’s strong strategic focus was important in its success. Finally, 
the Xerox Corporation was unable to commit to a structure akin to that 
of  a  traditional  venture  capital  partnership.  Despite  efforts by  XTV’s 
founders to model the fund as closely as possible after a traditional ven- 
ture partnership, the fund was still dissolved early. This experience under- 
scores the challenges that these hybrid organizational forms face. 
1.3  The Data Set 
We now turn to a more systematic assessment of the experience of cor- 
porate venture programs. Before doing so, however, we  discuss the Ven- 
tureOne database used in this analysis. Ventureone, established in 1987, 
collects data on firms that have obtained venture capital financing. The 
database includes firms that have  received early stage equity financing 
5.  This paragraph is based on information from the Xerox website and Turner (1997) The Determinants of Corporate Venture Capital Success  29 
from venture capital organizations, corporate venture capital programs, 
and other organizations. 
The companies are initially identified from a wide variety of sources, 
including trade publications, company web pages, and telephone contacts 
with venture investors. Ventureone then collects information about the 
businesses through interviews with venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. 
Among the data collected are the names of the investors, the amount and 
valuation of the venture financings, and the industry, history, and current 
status of the firm. Data on the firms are updated and validated through 
monthly contacts with investors and firms.6  Ventureone then markets the 
database to venture funds and corporate business development groups (for 
a detailed discussion of the database, see Gompers and Lerner [2000]). 
We supplemented the Ventureone data when necessary. Information on 
some firms in the Ventureone sample was missing, such as an assignment 
to one of the 103 Ventureone industry classes or information on the firm’s 
start date. We examined a variety of reference sources to determine this in- 
formation, including the corporate Technology Directory (Corporate Tech- 
nology Information Service  1996), the  Million  Dollar  Directory  (Dun’s 
Marketing Services 1996), Ward) Business Directory  of  US.  Private and 
Public Companies (Gale Research 1996), the Directory of Leading Private 
Companies (National Register Publishing Company 1996), and a consider- 
able number of state and industry business directories in the collections of 
Harvard Business School’s Baker Library and the Boston Public Library. 
We also employed several electronic databases: the Company Intelligence 
and Database America compilations available through LEXIS’S COMPANY/ 
USPRIV library and the American Business Disk CD-ROM directory. 
The investors in the Ventureone database were diverse. They included 
individuals, institutions (e.g., pension funds), traditional independent ven- 
ture funds (e.g., Kleiner, Perkins, Caufield, and Byers), and funds spon- 
sored by  corporations, financial institutions, and government bodies. In 
order to understand the effect of organizational structure, in many of the 
analyses presented below we concentrate on two types of funds: indepen- 
dent venture partnerships and corporate funds. As discussed above, we 
eliminated other hybrid venture funds, such as those affiliated with com- 
mercial and investment banks, because many of these closely resembled 
traditional venture organizations. 
In order to identify independent and corporate venture capital organi- 
zations, we used an unpublished database of venture organizations assem- 
6.  Information about the financing of private firms is typically not revealed in public docn- 
ments, and investors and entrepreneurs may consider this to be sensitive information. Ven- 
tureOne seeks to overcome this reluctance by emphasizing that its database also helps firms 
obtain financing. In particular, firms can alert investors whether they intend to seek further 
private financing or intend to go public in upcoming months. 30  Paul A. Gompers and Josh Lerner 
bled by  the Venture Economics Investors Services Group. Venture Eco- 
nomics is a unit of the Securities Data Company that tracks the venture 
capital industry. The organization was known as Capital Publishing when 
it was established  in  1961 to prepare a newsletter  on federally chartered 
small business investment companies (SBICs). Since 1977, the company 
has maintained a database on venture  partnerships,  a database that in- 
cludes over two thousand venture capital funds, SBICs, and related organ- 
izations. The Investors Services Group database is used in the preparation 
of directories, such as the Venture Economics annual Investment Bench- 
mark Performuncr. The database is compiled from information provided 
by venture capitalists and institutional investors. We excluded from either 
classification  a variety  of private equity investors, including individuals, 
SBICs, funds sponsored by  banks and other financial institutions,  and 
funds associated with financial subsidiaries of nonfinancial corporations 
(such as General Electric Capital). In order to determine whether a com- 
pany was a nonfinancial  corporation,  we  consulted  the firm directories 
noted above to determine the main lines of business in the year of the invest- 
ment. By  so doing, we sought to draw as sharp a contrast as possible be- 
tween corporate and independent funds. 
In some cases, it was difficult to ascertain  whether an investor was a 
corporate venture organization. Some U.S. and several European compa- 
nies invest in companies through traditional venture capital partnerships. 
For example, Eastman Kodak not only makes direct equity investments, 
but also invests through a partnership called Aperture Partners, in which 
it is the sole limited partner. While we were able to identify many of these 
cases, we may have missed some. In other cases, independent venture or- 
ganizations also cater to corporate investors. A prominent example is Ad- 
vent, a Boston-based organization that organizes comingled funds for fi- 
nancial investors and other funds for single corporate  limited  partners. 
From the Ventureone database, it is usually difficult to determine whether 
the private equity group is investing its traditional partnerships or one of 
its corporate funds. 
Finally, for the corporate venture capital investments, we characterized 
the degree of fit between  the corporation  and the portfolio  firm. To  do 
this, we examined the corporate annual reports of the parent firm for the 
fiscal years 1983, 1989, and 1994. We classified investments as to whether 
there was a direct fit between one of the corporation’s lines of business 
highlighted in the annual report closest to the year of the investment and 
the portfolio firm, whether there was an indirect relation, or whether there 
was no apparent relation at all. In the analyses below, we denoted invest- 
ments as having a strategic fit only if there was a direct relation between a 
line of business of the corporate parent and the portfolio firm. The results 
are robust to expanding the definition to include indirectly related transac- The Determinants of Corporate Venture Capital Success  31 
tions as well: for example, when a corporate fund invests in a firm that is 
a potential supplier to or customer of the corporate parent. Not all invest- 
ments were classified. In some cases, we  were not able to determine the 
relation. In others, we  could not obtain the proximate annual reports. In 
particular, it was difficult to obtain the 1983 and 1989 annual reports for 
many of the foreign firms. 
We limited the analysis to investments in privately held firms between 
1983 and 1994. While Ventureone has sought to “backfill” its database 
with information on earlier venture investments, its coverage of the 1970s 
and early 1980s is poor. Furthermore, we were concerned that the Venture- 
One methodology may have introduced selection biases. While the data- 
base does not include all venture investments between 1983 and 1994, we 
believe that it provides a reasonable view of the activity in the industry 
during this period.’ We did not include investments made after 1994 be- 
cause we wish to assess the outcomes of the investments: it may take sev- 
eral years until the fate of venture-backed firms is clear. We also eliminated 
a variety of investments that were outside the scope of this analysis, such 
as purchases of shares of publicly traded firms and other financings. 
1.4  Empirical Analyses 
We now analyze this sample empirically. After presenting an overview 
of the sample, we undertake analyses of the ultimate success of corporate 
and other venture investments as well as the duration of the venture invest- 
ment programs themselves. 
1.4.1  Summary Statistics 
Table 1.1 provides an overview of the sample by year. After the deletions 
noted above, the sample consists of 32,364 investments. Investments by 
independent venture funds represent over half the total transactions in the 
sample. Corporate venture investments represent a much smaller share, 
about 6 percent. Because on average about four investors participate in 
each financing round, the number of rounds, 8,506, is significantly smaller. 
Below, we analyze patterns on both the investment and the round level.8 
7. For an analysis of the comprehensiveness of the Ventureone database over time, see 
Gompers and Lerner (2000). We  address concerns about selection biases by  repeating the 
analyses below using only observations from 1988 to 1994, when Ventureone’s coverage of 
the industry was much more comprehensive. The results are little changed. 
8. The reader may note that the dollar amounts reported here are greater in some years 
than are the cumulative disbursements from venture capital funds reported elsewhere (e.g., 
Kortum and Lerner  1998). This reflects the fact that the Ventureone data represent total 
financings from all sources for privately held venture-backed firms rather than just funds 
from venture capital organizations. 32  Paul A. Gompers and Josh Lerner 
Table 1.1  Distribution of the Sample, by Year 
Number of Investments 
Corporate  Independent  Number  Dollar 









































































Total  32,364  2,032  17,067  8,506  39,492 
Nore: The table depicts the number of venture capital investments in the Ventureone sample 
by  year between  1983 and 1994 as well as the number of financing rounds (a round may 
consist of several investments by  different investors) and the aggregate amount of  funding 
disbursed (in millions of 1994 dollars). Similar tabulations of the number of investments are 
presented for corporate and independent venture funds. VC = venture capital. 
Table 1.2 provides a comparison of four categories of investment: the 
total sample, investments by  corporate and independent venture capital 
organizations, and corporate investments where there was a strategic fit 
between the parent and the portfolio firm. In general, the corporate invest- 
ments closely resemble those of the other funds: 
Status at Time of  Investment. Corporate funds tend to invest slightly less 
frequently in start-up and mature private firms. Instead, they are dispro- 
portionately represented among companies in the middle stages, such as 
“development” or “beta.”9 
Location of  Firm. The sample disproportionately includes investments in 
firms based in California. This reflects Ventureone’s greater coverage of 
this region, particularly in the early years (for a discussion, see Gompers 
and Lerner [2000]). While corporate venture investments as a whole are 
slightly more common in California than are other venture investments, 
corporate investments with a strong strategic fit are more frequent else- 
where. 
9. For definitions of stages, regions, and industries, see the appendix. The Determinants of Corporate Venture Capital Success  33 
Table 1.2  Characteristics of Firms at the Time of Investment 
Entire  Corporate  Corporate VC and  Independent 
Sample  VC Only  Strategic Fit  VC Only 
Status at time of investment (“/u): 
Start-up  9.8 
Development  30.5 
Beta  4.1 
Profitable  1.6 
Restart  2.4 
All Western United States  59.1 
California  51.6 
All Eastern United States  24.1 
Massachusetts  12.8 
Medical  25.5 
Computer hardware  16.7 
Communications  14.5 
Computer software on-line 
services  15.1 
Other  28.1 
Mean  2.4 
Median  2 
Shipping  45.5 
Location of firm (YO): 
Industry of firm (“YO): 
Round of investment: 
Age of firm at time of 
investment: 
Mean  3.9 
Median  3.0 
Amount invested in venture 
round: 
Mean  6.1 
































































Note; The sample consists of 32,364 investments in privately held venture-backed firms between 1983 
and 1994. The table presents the stage of the firm’s development at the time of the investment, the 
geographic location of the firm, the industry of the firm, the ordinal rank of the venture round, the age 
of the firm at the time of the investment (in years), and the amount of the investment in the financing 
round (in millions of 1994 dollars). Separate tabulations are presented for investments by  corporate 
venture firms, corporate funds where there was a strategic fit between the parent and the portfolio 
firms, and independent venture funds. VC = venture capital. 
Industry of the Firm. Venture capital investments tend to focus on a few 
high-technology industries. This is even more true for corporate venture 
investments with a strategic focus. 
Maturity of Firm and Investment Characteristics. Corporate venture funds 
tend to invest in later and larger financing rounds and in slightly older 
firms than other venture funds. 34  Paul A. Gompers and Josh Lerner 
1.4.2  Success of Investments 
We now consider the success of the investments by the various types of 
venture organizations. The discussions of the importance of the indepen- 
dent venture organizations’ partnership structure noted above suggest that 
these investors should  have  the  greatest  success.  Meanwhile,  potential 
complementarities  with existing lines of business  suggest that corporate 
investments may also perform well, at least those where there is a strong 
strategic fit. 
The measurement  of returns presents some challenging issues. Ideally, 
we would capture the direct and indirect returns to each class of venture 
investor. Unfortunately, because Ventureone  does not compile the stake 
held by each investor, we cannot compute the direct financial returns for 
particular investors. Furthermore, it is difficult to identify the indirect ben- 
efits-for  example, an insight that leads to a redirected research program 
in a corporate laboratory-that  corporate venture investors receive, much 
less to quantify these benefits. As a result, we employ two less satisfactory 
but more tractable measures. 
The first is the success of the firm receiving the funds. This is likely to 
be a reasonable measure for traditional venture groups. Venture capitalists 
generate the bulk  of their profits from firms that go public. A Venture 
Economics (1988) study finds that a $1 .OO investment in a firm that goes 
public provides  an average cash return  of $1.95 in excess of the initial 
investment  with  an average holding  period  of 4.2 years. The next  best 
alternative as estimated by  Venture Economics  (1988), an investment in 
an acquired firm, yields a cash return of only $0.40 over a 3.7-year mean 
holding period. This measure is also likely to have some validity for corpo- 
rate venture investors. If the venture fails, the key people and knowledge 
are likely to be scattered,  and the benefits to the corporation  are likely 
to be few. A more successful venture may or may not provide indirect bene- 
fits to the corporate parent  but at least should have attractive financial 
returns. 
We determine the status of the firms in spring 1998 from the Venture- 
One database. Table 1.3 presents the outcomes for four classes of investors 
as well as tests of the statistical significance of the differences between 
them.  Firms backed  by corporate venture groups are significantly more 
likely to have gone public than those financed by other organizations and 
are less likely to have been liquidated. These differences are particularly 
strong for investments in which there was a strategic tie between the corpo- 
rate parent and the portfolio firm. These comparisons may be influenced, 
however, by differences between the firms backed by  corporate and those 
backed by other venture investors. 
To  address this  concern,  we  examine  these  patterns  in  a  regression 
framework (see table  1.4). We estimate logit regressions, alternatively  us- The Determinants of Corporate Venture Capital Success  35 
Table 1.3  Status of Firms in Spring 1998 
A. Status of Firms in Spring 1998 
Entire  Corporate  Corporate VC  and  Independent 
Sample  VC Only  Strategic Fit  VC Only 
IPO completed  31.1  35.1  39.3  30.6 
Registration statement filed  0.7  0.2  0.3  0.7 
Acquired  29.0  29.0  21.5  30.3 
Still privately held  20.6  21.1  18.3  19.7 
Liquidated  18.7  14.6  14.7  18.7 
B. p-Value, Tests of Equality of Firm Status in Spring 1998 
Probability of IPO, 
Registration, 
Probability  or Acquisition  Probability 
of IPO  at > 2X Value  Not Liquidated 
Corporate VC vs. all others  ,000  ,002 
Independent VC vs. all others  .043  ,557 
vs. independent VC  ,000  ,000 
Corporate VC vs. independent VC  ,000  .005 





Note: The sample consists of 32,364 investments in privately held venture-backed firms between 1983 
and  1994. Panel A presents the status of the firms in spring 1998. Separate tabulations are presented 
for investments by corporate venture firms, corporate funds where there was a strategic fit between the 
parent and the portfolio firms, and independent venture funds. Panel B  presents the p-values from 
Pearson x2  tests of the equality of three outcomes (completion of an IPO; IPO or filing of a registration 
statement or acquisition at twice [in inflation-adjusted dollars] the post-money  valuation at the time of 
the investment; and not being liquidated) in different subsamples. VC  = venture capital. IPO = initial 
public offering. 
ing each investment and each financing round as observations. We seek to 
explain the probability that the investment had gone public by spring 1998 
or the probability that the firm had gone public, filed a registration with 
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (a preliminary step before 
going public), or been acquired for a valuation of at least twice the post- 
money valuation of the financing.'O As independent variables, we use the 
age of  the firm at the time of  the investment and the ordinal rank of the 
investment round. We also employ dummy variables denoting investments 
by  corporate and independent venture capital funds, corporate venture 
10. The results are also robust to the use of a third dependent variable, the probability 
that the firm has not been liquidated by spring 1998. 
The post-money  vuluution is defined as the product of the price paid per share in the fi- 
nancing round and the shares outstanding after the financing round. In calculating the valua- 
tions, Ventureone converts all preferred shares into common stock at the conversion ratios 
specified in the agreements. Warrants and options outstanding are included in the total, as 
long as their exercise price is below the price per share being paid in the financing round. Table 1.4  Logit Regression Analyses of Firms’ Status in  Spring 1998 
Observations Are Investments 
Did Firm Go Public, Register, 
or Have Favorable Acquisition? 
Observations Are Rounds: 
Did Firm Go Public?  Did Firm Go Public? 
Age of firm at time of financing 
Round number 
Corporate venture investment? 
Independent venture investment? 
Corporate investment and strategic fit? 
Firm based in California? 
Firm based in Massachusetts? 


























































































(3.68) Firm is in beta stage? 
Firm is in shipping stage? 
Firm is in profitable stage? 
Firm is in restart stage? 
Log-likelihood  - 
X*-statistic 
p-value 

































- 15,477.4  - 
2,065.5 
0.000 





































Note: The sample in the first four regressions consists of 32,364 investments in privately held venture-backed firms between 1983 and 1994, in the fifth and 
sixth regressions 8,506 financing rounds of privately held, venture-backed firms between 1983 and 1994. The dependent variable in the first, second, fifth, 
and sixth regressions is a dummy variable that takes on the value of one if the firm had gone public by spring 1998. In the third and fourth regressions, the 
dummy takes the value of one if  the firm had gone public, filed  a registration  statement, or been acquired  at twice (in inflation-adjusted  dollars) the 
post-money  valuation at the time of the investment by  spring  1998. Independent variables include the age of the firm at the time of the investment, the 
ordinal rank of the investment round, and dummy variables denoting investments by corporate and independent venture capital funds, corporate venture 
investments where there was a strategic fit with the portfolio firm, firms based in California and Massachusetts, the status of the firm at the time of the 
investment, the year of the investment (not reported), the industry of the firm (nst reported), and a constant (not reported). All dummy variables take on 
the value of one if the answer to the posed question is in the affirmative. Absolute t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 38  Paul A. Gompers and Josh Lerner 
investments where there was a strategic fit with the portfolio firm, firms 
based in California and Massachusetts, the status of  the firm at the time 
of the investment, the year of the investment, the industry of the firm, and 
a constant. 
The results  are consistent  with  the  univariate  comparisons  reported 
above.  Corporate  venture  investments are significantly  more successful 
than other investments. (In most of the regressions, independent venture 
investments are also more successful, although the effect is smaller in mag- 
nitude and statistical significance.) When the dummy variable denoting cor- 
porate venture investments with a strategic fit is added to the regressions, 
the corporate  venture  dummy variable  becomes  insignificant  (and  fre- 
quently negative). Corporate venture investments in general do not per- 
form better, only those with a strategic fit. These results seem consistent 
with the complementarities hypothesis outlined above. 
Our second proxy for the direct and indirect returns for corporate and 
other  investors  is the valuation  assigned  to the firm at the time  of the 
investment. All else being equal, the higher the valuation (i.e., the higher 
the price paid per share), the lower the direct financial returns to the in- 
vestor (subject to the caveats outlined in the discussion below). For each 
investment  round  for which  data were  available  (about  half  the entire 
sample), we computed the pre-money  valuation, the product of the price 
paid per share in the financing round, and the shares outstanding before 
the financing round." 
Table 1.5 presents the pre-money  valuations for the four classes of in- 
vestors tabulated  above as well as tests of the statistical significance of 
these differences. Corporate venture funds do appear to pay significantly 
more, with a mean pre-money  valuation of $28.5 million, as compared to 
an average of $18.1 million for the independent venture firms. Corporate 
investments in which there is a strategic fit are also priced at a premium, 
but the average price ($26.9 million) is lower than that of the other corpo- 
rate investments. 
Once again, we seek to corroborate these patterns through a regression 
analysis (see table  1.6). Following the approach of Gompers and Lerner 
(2000), we estimate a hedonic regression, seeking to explain the logarithm 
of the pre-money  valuations (for a detailed discussion of this methodol- 
ogy, see that paper). Once again, we  use each investment and each financ- 
ing round as observations. As independent variables, we use the logarithm 
of the age of the firm at the time of the investment and the logarithm of the 
ordinal rank of the investment round. We  also employ dummy variables 
denoting investments by corporate and independent venture capital funds, 
11. As discussed at length in Lerner (l994),  the pre-money  valuation is a more appropriate 
dependent variable than the post-money  valuation because it is independent of the amount 
invested  in the firm during the current financing round. As Gompers (1995) discusscs, the 
amount invested  may vary with many  considerations, including the fund-raising environ- 
ment. The Determinants of Corporate Venture Capital Success  39 
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Table 1.5  Pre-Money  Valuation at the Time of Financing 
A. Pre-Money  Valuation at Time of Financing 
Entire  Corporate  Corporate VC and  Independent 
Sample  VC Only  Strategic Fit  VC Only 
Mean 
Median 
20.1  28.5  26.9  18.1 
12.9  17.4  15.9  11.7 
Corporate VC vs. all others 
Independent VC vs. all others 
Corporate VC vs. independent VC 
Corporate VC and strategic fit vs. 
independent VC 
B. p-Value, Tests of Equality of Pre-Money  Valuations 









Note: The sample consists of 32,364 investments in privately held venture-backed firms between 1983 
and 1994. Panel A presents the mean and median pre-money  valuation of the firms at the time of the 
financing. The pre-money  valuation is defined as the product of the price paid per share in the financing 
round and the shares outstanding prior to the financing round. Separate tabulations are presented for 
investments by  corporate venture firms, corporate funds where there was a strategic fit between the 
parent and portfolio firms, and independent venture funds. Panel B presents the p-values from t-tests 
and Wilcoxon  rank-sum tests of the equality of the mean and median valuations in different subsam- 
ples. VC = venture capital. 
corporate venture investments where there was a strategic fit with the port- 
folio firm, firms based in California and Massachusetts, the status of the 
firm at the time of the investment, the year of the investment, the industry 
of the firm, and a constant. 
We  find results similar to those in the univariate comparisons. Corpo- 
rate venture investments are associated with between  18 and 30 percent 
higher valuations, while those by  independent funds are associated with 
between 7 and 18 percent lower valuations. The dummy variable denoting 
corporate venture investments with a strategic fit is inconsistent in sign 
and never significant. 
These results suggest two possible interpretations. First, traditional ven- 
ture investors and entrepreneurs could be exploiting the relative inexperi- 
ence of the corporate venture investors, persuading them to invest in over- 
valued transactions (see, e.g., AbuZayyad et al. 1997). Second, corporate 
investors are likely to enjoy some indirect benefits from their involvement 
with portfolio firms that independent venture firms do not enjoy. Standard 
bargaining models (e.g., Nash  1950) suggest that the additional surplus 
enjoyed by  the corporation will lead to corporate venture capitalists in- 
vesting at higher prices than others. In this way,  some of the additional 
value created will be allocated to the smaller firm and its existing investors. 
Disentangling  these  interpretations  is  difficult.  Nonetheless,  we  are 
struck by  the lack of a relation between the price premium paid and the Table 1.6  Ordinary Least Squares Regression Analyses of the Pre-Money  Valuation at the Time of the Financing 
Observations Are Investments  Observations Are Rounds 
Logarithm of age of firm 
Logarithm of round number 
Corporate venture investment? 
Independent venture investment? 
Corporate investment and strategic fit? 
Firm based in California? 
Firm based in Massachusetts? 
Firm is in development stage? 




































































(6.10) Firm is in shipping stage? 
Firm is in profitable stage? 




Number of observations 
0.58  0.57  0.60  0.60 
(18.86)  (18.26)  (10.28)  (10.30) 
1.10  1.09  1.15  1.15 
(29.06)  (28.61)  (15.51)  (15.54) 
-0.85  -0.84  -0.72  -0.72 
(17.22)  (17.00)  (7.04)  (7.04) 
0.39  0.39  0.43  0.43 
397.  I  371.5  102.0  98.3 
0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
15,895  15,406  3,544  3,544 
Note; The sample in the first two regressions consists of 32,364 investments in privately held, venture-backed firms between 1983 and 1994, in third and 
fourth regressions 8,506 financing rounds of privately held, venture-backed firms between 1983 and 1994. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the 
pre-money  valuation of the firms at the time of the financing. The pre-money  valuation is defined as the product of the price paid per share in the financing 
round and the shares outstanding prior to the financing round. Independent variables include the logarithm of the age of  the firm at the time of  the 
investment, the logarithm of  the ordinal rank of the investment round, and dummy variables denoting investments by corporate and independent venture 
capital funds, corporate venture investments where there was a strategic fit with the portfolio firm, firms based in California and Massachusetts, the status 
of the firm at the time of the investment, the year of the investment (not reported), the industry of the firm (not reported), and a constant (not reported). 
All dummy variables take on the value of one if the answer to the posed question is in the affirmative. Absolute t-statistics are reported in parentheses. VC = 
venture capital. 42  Paul A. Gompers and Josh Lerner 
degree of strategic fit. We suggest that this may reflect the fact that corpo- 
rations are also more savvy investors in companies close to their existing 
lines of business. While the indirect benefits to the parent may be greater 
in these instances, resulting in a willingness to pay more, its understanding 
of the market is also likely to be better. As a result, the corporation may 
be less likely to invest in overpriced transactions in these cases. In areas 
outside the corporation’s experience, overpaying for investments may be a 
more common phenomenon. 
1.4.3  Duration of Programs 
Finally, we consider the duration of the venture organizations. Table 1.7 
presents several measures of the stability of these organizations. First, we 
examine the total number of investments in the sample. Similarly, we ex- 
amine the time span (in years) between the first and the last investment in 
the sample by  each venture  organization. (A  venture  organization  that 
made a single investment would be coded as having a time span of 0.) 
Both these measures, however, are somewhat problematic. Many corpo- 
rate venture programs have begun in recent years. As a result, they may 
have made only a few investments to date. This does not imply, however, 
that they will not continue to exist for a long time. To control for this “vin- 
tage effect,” we create a third measure: the time between the first and the 
last investments by the venture organization in the sample expressed as a 
percentage of the time from the first investment by the venture organiza- 
tion to December  1994. Using this approach, both a long-standing ven- 
ture group and a relatively recent program that remains active through the 
end of the sample period would be coded as 1 .O. 
Unlike the earlier analyses, we confine the analysis (and that in table 1.8 
below) to independent and corporate venture funds. Some of the other 
investors are reported in an inconsistent manner, which would make this 
type of analysis potentially  misleading. For instance, when only a small 
number of individuals invest, the more prominent ones are identified by 
name. When a large number invest, all are lumped together as “individ- 
uals.” 
Stark differences appear between  the corporate and the independent 
funds. The corporations make a mean of 4.4 investments over 2.5 years, 
while the independent funds make 43.5 investments over 7.1 years. Even 
using the ratio of the active time span to the possible time span, the differ- 
ences are dramatic: the average is 34.8 percent for the corporate funds, as 
opposed  to 7 1.7 percent  for the independent funds. The differences are 
less extreme, but still significant, for the corporate programs where there 
was a strategic fit in at least half the investments. 
We  then examine these patterns in a regression analysis (see table 1 .8). 
The first two regressions  employ all corporate and independent venture 
organizations  in  the sample as observations,  the second set  only those Table 1.7  Duration of Investment Programs 
A. Duration of Investment Programs 
Corporate and 
lndependent  Corporate VC  Corporate VC and  Independent 
VC Funds  Only  Strategic Fit  VC Only 
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B. p-Value, Tests of Equality of Investment Program Duration 
Number of  Ratio of Active to 
Investments  Time Span  Possible Time Span 
Mean  Median  Mean  Mean  Median  Median 
Corporate VC  vs. independent VC  ,000  ,000  ,000  .ooo  ,000  ,000 
Corporate VC and strategic fit vs. independent VC  ,000  ,000  ,000  .ooo  .oo 1  .ooo 
Noret The sample consists of 19,099 investments by  855 corporate and independent venture funds in privately held firms between 1983 and 1994. Panel A 
presents the mean and median number of investments during the sample period by each venture organization, the time span between the first and the last 
investments by  the venture organization in the sample (in years), and the time span between the first and the last investments by  the venture organization 
in the sample expressed as a percentage of the time span from the first investment by  the venture organization to December 1994. Separate tabulations are 
presented for investments by  corporate venture firms, corporate venture funds where there was a strategic fit with the portfolio firm in at least half the 
investments, and independent venture funds. Panel B presents thep-values from r-tests and Wilcoxon rank-sum tests of the equality of the mean and median 
measures of duration in different subsamples. VC  = venture capital. 44  Paul A. Gompers and Josh Lerner 
Table 1.8  Double-Censored Regression Analyses of Duration of 
Investment Program 
All Corporate  Corporate and 
and Independent  Independent Funds with 
VC Funds  2 4 Investments 
Date of first investment 
Corporate venture fund? 



















































Note: The sample consists of 855 corporate and independent venture funds that invested in 
privately held firms between 1983 and 1994. The dependent variable is the time between the 
first and the last investments by  the venture organization in the sample expressed as a per- 
centage of the time from the first investment by the venture organization to December 1994. 
The first two regressions employ all observations, the second set only those organizations 
with four or more investments in the sample. Independent variables include the date of the 
venture organization’s first investment (with an investment in May  1992 expressed as 1992.4 
etc.), dummy variables denoting observations of corporate venture capital funds and of cor- 
porate venture funds where there was a strategic fit with the portfolio firm in at least half 
the investments, and a constant. All dummy variables take on the value of one if the answer 
to the posed question is in the affirmative. Absolute t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
VC = venture capital. 
organizations with four or more investments in the sample.12  As a depend- 
ent variable, we  use the ratio of the time span that the fund was active to 
the time span from its first investment to December 1994. Independent 
variables include the date of  the venture organization’s first investment, 
dummy variables denoting observations of corporate venture capital funds 
and of corporate venture funds where there was a strategic fit with the 
portfolio firms in at least half the investments, and a constant. Reflecting 
the fact that the dependent variable must fall between zero and one, we 
employ a double-censored regression specification. 
Once again, the corporate venture programs have a significantly shorter 
duration. The dummy variable for corporate venture programs in which 
at least half the investments were strategic, however, has a positive coeffi- 
cient of almost equal magnitude. While corporate programs without a stra- 
12. In this way,  we  seek to examine whether groups that dissolve after only one or two 
investments drive the results or whether this is a more general pattern. The results are also 
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tegic focus are very unstable, those with such a focus appear to have a 
longevity equivalent to more traditional independent funds, at least using 
this measure. 
We consider two explanations for the shorter time span of the corporate 
investments. One possibility  is  that  this  is a  response to technological 
change. An extensive literature on the economics of innovation has high- 
lighted that new  entrants often exploit technological  breakthroughs  in 
more innovative and aggressive ways than do the established incumbents 
and that these changes are often associated with dramatic shifts in market 
1eader~hip.I~  In many cases, product leaders have rapidly lost their com- 
manding position after many years of dominance. Academics have attrib- 
uted these patterns to a rational reluctance on the part of existing industry 
leaders to jeopardize their current revenues and profits as well as to the 
myopic reluctance of many successful organizations to recognize that their 
leadership is waning. (In many instances, the continuing financial success 
of mature product lines masks the organizations’ failure to introduce new 
Corporate venture  capital programs may  be  a response to 
these short-run periods of technological discontinuity.  Once this transi- 
tion period has passed, the corporation may dissolve the effort. 
Alternatively, the instability may reflect the manner in which the cor- 
porate programs are designed. One important argument in favor of the 
decade-long partnership structure typically employed by independent ven- 
ture funds is that it allows venture capitalists  to make long-run  invest- 
ments without the fear of demands to liquidate their portfolios. (For a 
discussion of how such fears can affect the behavior of hedge fund manag- 
ers, who typically do not have these protections, see Shleifer and Vishny 
[  19971.)  Corporate venture funds are typically structured as corporate divi- 
sions or affiliates without the protections afforded by a legal partnership 
agreement.  Furthermore, field research  suggests that corporate venture 
groups are often plagued by defections of their most successful investors, 
who become frustrated at their low level of compensation. These defec- 
tions may also affect the stability of the groups. This view suggests that all 
corporate venture programs should be less stable. 
It is a challenge to reconcile either hypothesis with the evidence. If pro- 
grams were generally designed to address short-run technological discon- 
tinuities, it should be the strategic programs that were of the shortest dura- 
13. Two academic studies documenting these patterns (there are also many other more 
14. For an overview, see Reinganum (1989). 
15. For instance, the pharmaceutical industry was ill prepared for the biotechnology revo- 
lution in the early 1980s. Henderson and Cockburn (1996) show that the more successful 
firms responded  by  aggressively establishing outside relationships to access new  ideas in 
response to this technological discontinuity. One avenue through which the firms built exter- 
nal relationships was corporate venture programs. 
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tion. This is clearly not the case. The structural view suggests that most 
corporate venture programs should be terminated rapidly, which is hard 
to reconcile with the success of programs with strong strategic objectives. 
One possibility is that the organizations  without a clear strategic focus 
also tend to be the ones with a low degree of autonomy and low levels of 
incentive compensation. Thus, the limited duration of the funds without 
a clear  strategic focus may  be  a proxy for the organizational  structure 
employed by independent venture funds. 
1.5  Conclusions 
This paper has compared investments by corporate venture organiza- 
tions with those of independent and other venture groups. Corporate ven- 
ture investments in entrepreneurial firms appear to be at least as success- 
ful (using such measures as the probability  of the portfolio firm going 
public) as those backed by independent venture organizations, particularly 
when there is  a strategic overlap between the corporate parent  and the 
portfolio firm. While corporate venture capitalists tend to invest at a pre- 
mium to other firms, this premium appears to be no higher in investments 
with a strong strategic fit. Finally, corporate programs without a strong 
strategic focus appear to be much less stable, frequently ceasing operations 
after only a few investments, but strategically focused programs appear to 
be as stable as independent venture organizations. The evidence is consis- 
tent with the existence of complementarities that allow corporations to 
select and add value to portfolio firms effectively, but it is  somewhat at 
odds with the suggestion that the structure of corporate funds introduces 
distortions. 
The paper suggests that the presence of a strong strategic focus is critical 
to the success of corporate venture funds. This subset of corporate funds 
appears to have been quite successful, despite having very different struc- 
tures from traditional funds. This finding appears to challenge the empha- 
sis in the finance literature on the importance of the partnership structure 
employed by independent private equity funds. But, as alluded to in sec- 
tion  1.4 above, it may well  be that corporate programs without a clear 
strategic focus are also the ones with a low degree of autonomy and low 
levels of compensation. To  distinguish  between these hypotheses  com- 
prehensively, we  would need  to have information on the compensation 
schemes and organizational structures employed by these groups. This pa- 
per has only skimmed the surface of this issue, and this is a rich area for 
further exploration, which we hope to undertake in future research. 
The analysis raises several puzzles that  cannot be answered with the 
existing data. We end by highlighting two of these. First, why do corpora- 
tions set up programs that appear likely to be unsuccessful? In the sample, The Determinants of Corporate Venture Capital Success  47 
for instance, we  see repeated examples of funds being established that do 
not have a clear relationship to the corporate parent’s lines of business. 
Certainly, in many cases, carefully thought through proposals appear to 
have been modified during the review process in ways that are likely sub- 
stantially to reduce their likelihood of success. Understanding these pro- 
cesses and placing them in the context of  the broader literature on the 
problems that can beset corporate decision making are interesting areas 
for future research. 
Second, is there an optimal mixture between internally funded corpo- 
rate research and outside ideas accessed through initiatives such as cor- 
porate  venture programs? Some high-technology corporations,  such as 
AT&T and IBM, have historically funded internal research laboratories at 
high levels. Other high-technology giants, such as Cisco Systems, have re- 
lied on acquisitions and strategic investments to identify and access prod- 
uct and process innovations. The “make-or-buy’’ decisions that corporate 
R&D managers face is an important but little-researched issue. 
Appendix 
Definition of Firm Categorizations 
The  definitions provided  below  have  been  adapted  from  Ventureone 
(1998). 
Investment Stages 
Start-up: Company with a skeletal business plan, product, or service de- 
velopment in preliminary stages. 
Development: Product or service development is under way,  but the com- 
pany is not generating revenues from sales. 
Beta:  For  companies  specializing in  information  technology, the  beta 
phase is when the product is being tested by  a limited number of cus- 
tomers but not available for broad sales. For life sciences companies, 
beta is  synonymous with a drug in  human  clinical trials or a device 
being tested. 
Shipping: The product or service is being sold to customers, and the com- 
pany is deriving revenues from those sales, but expenses still exceed rev- 
enues. 
Profitable: The company is selling products or services, and the sales reve- 
nue yields a positive net income. 
Restart: A recapitalization at a reduced valuation, accompanied by a sub- 
stantial shift in the product or marketing focus. 48  Paul A. Gompers and Josh Lerner 
Industry Groups 
Computer hardware: Firms whose primary lines of business are personal 
computing,  minicomputers  or  workstations,  mainframe  computers, 
CAD/CAM/CAE systems, data storage, computer peripherals, memory 
systems, office automation, source data collection, multimedia devices, 
and computer networking devices. 
Computer software: Firms whose primary lines of business are compilers, 
assemblers, and systems, application,  CAD/CAM/CAE/CASE,  recre- 
ational and home, artificial intelligence, educational, multimedia soft- 
ware, and on-line services. 
Communications: Firms whose primary lines of business include modems, 
computer networking, fiber optics, microwave and satellite communica- 
tions, telephone equipment, pocket paging, cellular phones, radar and 
defense systems, television equipment, teleconferencing, and television 
and radio broadcasting. 
Medical:  Firms whose primary lines of business include biotechnology, 
pharmaceuticals, diagnostic imaging, patient monitoring, medical de- 
vices, medical lab instruments, hospital equipment, medical supplies, 
retail  medicine, hospital  management, medical data processing, and 
medical lab services. 
Regions 
Eastern United States: Firms whose headquarters are located in Connecti- 
cut, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Maine, Maryland, Massachu- 
setts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, Vermont, and West Virginia. 
Western United States: Firms whose headquarters are located in Alaska, 
Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New 
Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. 
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Comment  Michael S. Weisbach 
The paper by  Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner is one of the first to study 
corporate venture programs. It starts with speculation from the literature 
that corporate venture capital funds will underperform other venture cap- 
ital programs. This underperformance would presumably occur because 
of agency problems inside corporations that discourage high-powered in- 
centives and risk taking inside corporate venture capital units as well as 
because of a lack of  a well-defined mission for the venture capital divi- 
sion (making money or providing technology to the rest of the firm?). To 
counter this point, Gompers and Lerner point out that corporate venture 
capital programs have some advantages from complementarities with the 
firm’s existing assets that potentially offset some of these disadvantages. 
The goal of the paper is to evaluate empirically whether the literature’s 
Michael S. Weisbach is the I.B.E. Distinguished Professor of Finance at the University of 
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speculation  about the relative performance of corporate venture capital 
funds is correct. The two offsetting factors that make this a potentially 
interesting empirical exercise are the agency costs discussed by the litera- 
ture and the complementarities between the investments and the firm’s 
assets. One issue that I have with this approach is that Gompers and Ler- 
ner do not spell out exactly what one would expect to observe in the data 
a priori. Both effects are undoubtedly present in some cases and are not 
mutually exclusive. In addition, sample-selection issues are not really dis- 
cussed in the paper-if  all programs are undertaken only if  the net ex- 
pected profitability (including expected agency costs and/or complemen- 
tarities) is positive, it is not clear what the relative profitability of programs 
that corporate and independent programs actually undertaken would be. 
The first part of the paper presents a case study of Xerox’s capital divi- 
sion, Xerox Technology Ventures. This case makes interesting reading, 
and the authors describe how this division of Xerox was  outrageously 
profitable, in large part because of investments in a company called Docu- 
mentum. What is not clear to me is why the case is included in the paper. 
It was clearly a positive outlier, but, if all that the authors wanted to dem- 
onstrate was that there were positive outliers, I would recommend some 
kind of plot of all the data. Such a plot would give the reader a feel for 
how likely such a positive outlier is. Sometimes case studies provide useful 
lessons not easily conveyed by conventional empirical work; however, I do 
not see that such lessons are learned here.’ I would encourage the authors 
to provide a better explanation of why they included the case in their study. 
The main empirical findings of the paper were as follows: First, corpo- 
rate investments, particularly “strategic” ones, go public more often than 
do independent venture capital investments (39.3 percent for corporate 
strategic investments, 35.1 percent for all corporate investments, and 30.6 
percent for independent venture capital investments). Second, corporate 
investments have higher “pre-money valuations” than do independent ven- 
ture capital investments. (Pre-money  vuhtion refers to the valuation  of 
the firm at the time the investment is made, equal to the product of the 
price paid per share times the number of shares outstanding prior to the 
investment.) Third, corporate venture capital programs have shorter dura- 
tions than independent venture capital funds. 
My overall reaction is that I liked the paper. It is on an important topic 
that the authors clearly know well. I learned  a lot from it. I just wish 
that I could have learned more and feel that I will in subsequent work on 
the topic. 
In terms of the specific results presented in the paper, I would caution 
1. One paper that does use case studies  effectively is Lerner and Merges (1998). In the discus- 
sion at the conference, Krishna Palepu pointed out that this case does serve as a counter- 
example to the arguments in  the literature and, as such, serves a useful  purpose for this 
reason. 52  Paul A. Gompers and Josh Lerner 
the reader about interpreting the higher initial public offering rate for cor- 
porate investments as meaning higher profitability. One agency problem 
common  in  corporations is that  they  are likely to be  overly conserva- 
tive in their investments. Compared to independent venture capital funds, 
they probably  are not going to undertake as risky investments and also 
are likely to undertake higher-quality investments. The authors do control 
(probably as well as they can given the available data) for the maturity of 
the companies in which the programs invest. Nonetheless, it seems likely 
that their measures are fairly crude proxies for the expected profitability 
of the companies. One possibility that the authors cannot really rule out is 
that the corporate venture programs invest in pricier but higher-potential 
companies but do not either add more value through their monitoring or 
make more money on their investments. 
The comparison  between corporate and independent  venture capital 
programs also ignores other benefits that go to the corporations sponsor- 
ing the programs. For example, I recently had a speaker in my  M.B.A. 
class who works in this industry. He told the class that you should never 
take money  from Microsoft-they  will just steal your idea and do the 
same thing inside their own company! The point is that Microsoft makes 
its money not directly through its investments but through the effect of 
those investments on the profitability of Microsoft’s other assets. 
In addition, the paper argues that the companies “invest at a premium.” 
The authors imply that this result means that the companies overpay for 
their investments. I am not sure that this interpretation is appropriate. It 
seems to me that the corporate valuations must be scaled by  something 
like assets or earnings for this measure to make sense. This result, like the 
previous one, is consistent with the possibility that the corporate venture 
programs simply invest in higher-quality start-up  companies than do inde- 
pendent venture capital funds. I think that this is an interesting interpreta- 
tion and that it deserves some discussion in the paper. I would also like to 
encourage the authors to think about the general issue of how one would 
distinguish between a fund that makes higher-quality investments ex ante 
and one that does a better job of monitoring once it has made the invest- 
ments. 
In conclusion, I think that the paper opens up a whole series of interest- 
ing questions about corporate venture capital. I found it a bit frustrating 
that the questions on the topic that I thought were the most interesting 
really are not discussed in this paper. For example, Why  do companies 
have some research projects done internally, some through contracts with 
an external firm, and some through “hybrid” contracts like a corporate 
venture capital program? Why are the contracts in corporate venture capi- 
tal programs structured the way they are? What organizational forces limit 
the scope of corporate venture capital? To what extent are agency prob- 
lems inside the sponsoring company responsible for the short lives of these The Determinants of Corporate Venture Capital Success  53 
programs? Does the corporate form induce excess conservatism in the in- 
vestments they make? To what extent are corporate venture programs used 
for the expansion of managerial power inside the sponsoring company? 
One hopes that the authors will  address some of  these questions in fu- 
ture work. 
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